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Beyond the Berle and Means paradigm:
private equity and the new capitalist order
Stephen F. Diamond

I

Introduction

The collapse of the credit markets that began to roil the global financial
system in the late summer of 2007 hit more than just the homebuilding
and mortgage sectors of the economy. As interest rates increased, pri
vate equity, or "PE," an important new form of financial capital, also
felt the shockwave. PE funds have grown substantially in size as well as
in political and financial significance in the last decade. The Blackstone
Group, for example, one of a handful of top tier PE funds, took over the
Hilton Hotels Corporation for $26 biJIion in 2007. Cerberus Capital,
another major PE player, surprised many when it announced plans to
buy the troubled Chrysler Group from DaimlerChrysler - a pioneering
venture into the tOP ranks of industrial United States.
KKR, one of the oldest PE funds, currently owns such a large
number of independent businesses that it is, indirectly, the second
largest employer in the United States with 560,000 employees, twice
as many as GM, ahead of MacDonald's and just behind Wal-Mart.
Today's PE fund managers have been hailed widely in the business
press as the new "masters of the universe," pushing aside bond traders
and investment bankers, not to mention lowly CEOs. The managers
of the largest funds are billionaires. Henry Kravis, the second "K"
in KKR, has a wing named after him at New York's Metropolitan
Museum of Art.
Since the credit freeze, however, the major banks that had made bil
lions in loans to PE funds to finance their leveraged buyouts ("LBOs")
of companies like Chrysler, Clear Channel or the UK's Alliance Boots
retail pharmacy giant, have been unable to re-sell those loans into the
wider capital markets, thus drying up the liquidity upon which PE
funds depend. In turn this caused the critical flow of capital to PE
funds to seize up, leading some to predict a quick end to the recent
"LBO boom.�' The Financial Times wondered whether PE might turn
out to be "a cyclical phenomenon of finite duration and questionable
151
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wisdom.'" Indeed, Bloomberg News concluded: "Private-equity firms
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slightly more than $100 billion in the first nine months of the year

have been hunkered down since the onset of the credit crisis about 16

relative to the $l1S billion raised in the same period the year before.'

months ago, scarred by broken deals and frustrated by the evaporation

In 2009, KKR led the IPO of one of its portfolio companies, the semi

of debt financing crucial to buyoutS."2

conductor firm Avago, raising $650 million.' KKR increased its over

These difficulties contributed to another problem for private equity.

all return by acting as deal manager and underwriter simultaneously.

In order to raise more capital and gain currency to finance expansion,

It also completed a second IPO of Dollar General in 2009, a discount

several private buyout funds, ironically, turned to the stock market

retailer that KKR took private in a $7.2 billion LBO in 2007. That

themselves, "going public" by selling a small percentage of their man
agement firms to outside investors. Most prominently, the Blackstone
Group went public in 2007 at a price of $31 a share in order to raise

deal generated a $239 million dividend for KKR and its partners. ' By

$4 billion for its partners and for expansion. The initial public offer

acting as co-lead underwriters with Goldman Sachs and Citigroup,
KKR also shared in the $64 million transaction fees generated by·the
deal.' KKR had originally put in some $2.S billion of its own money to

ing (IPO) placed a value on Blackstone of more than $33 billion. But

take the company private and that stake was valued in advance of the

within a few weeks the fear of a credit crunch and possible tax hikes

IPO at about $4.75 billion, "indicating a windfall for KKR," accord

caused the price of Blackstone shares to drop 22 percent, making it the

ing to the Wall Street Journal.' Meanwhile, Blackstone founder Stephen

worst performing IPO of 2007. In addition, investor advocacy groups

Schwarzman told an investors' conference in October 2008 that "the

including the AFL-CIO complained about the opaque governance

best returns in private equity have come in a period like the one that

structure that Blackstone used to shield its business operations from

we're just entering. This is an absolutely wonderful time."lo By mid-

scrutiny by its new shareholders.' The structure seemed designed to

2010, "private equity firms . . . sit atop an estimated $500 billion" in

avoid the oversight provisions of the federal Investment Company Act,
put in place in the New Deal era as a firewall to protect investors from

cash that has been raised from pension funds, endowments and foreign

governments. II

speculative activity by investment firms such as buyout funds. In other

This chapter will assume that, in fact, private equity as an institu

words, Blackstone was recreating within its own firm the very separ

tional form is here to stay. More significantly, I will argue that private

ation of ownership and control that it attempts to eliminate when it

equity attempts to solve one of the perennial problems long associated

buys out other corporations. Other major PE funds that had planned to

with the Anglo-American form of capitalism, the separation of owner

follow Blackstone's lead into the public markets began to have second

ship and control. The resolution of this issue now takes on even greater

thoughts.

importance with the collapse, at least for the time being, of the invest

Despite the downturn, however, cash has continued to flow to PE

ment banking model that has long been at the heart of modern finan

funds. At the end of the summer in 2007, according to the Wall Street
Journal, Blackstone announced it had raised the largest buyout fund

cial capitalism. As I argued recently in a paper with economist Jennifer

in history "despite the recent red flags in the debt markets," raising
a total of $21.7 billion. This included a $1 billion commitment from
the California State Teachers' Retirement System "along with a host
of other big public pension funds.'" This was soon followed by an
announcement by the Carlyle Group in early September that it had
successfully raised 5.3 billion euros for its European based buyout
operations. The pace in 200S indeed slowed, but fundraising secured
I

«The End of LBOs," Financial Times, July 27, 2007.
Jason Kelly, "Paulson's Capital May Bring Blackstone, Carlyle Back," Bloomberg,
October 17, 2008.
, This author advised the AFL-CIO on concerns with regard to the Blackstone IPO.
4 Laura Kreutzer, "Blackstone Closes Record Buyout Fund," Wall StreetJournal, August
8,2007.

2

5

"PE Fund-Raising Still Going Strong. Buyout Shops, Not So Much," Wall Street
Journal, October 7, 2008. Although fund-raising and deal flow were down signifi
cantly in late 2008, nonetheless PE funds had some $2.5 trillion under management
at the end of2008. Marko Maslakovic, Private Equity 2009, IFSL Research, London,
August 2009.
6 Peter Lattman, "KKR Affiliate Sees Value Increase, Strong Performance Comes as
Buyout Firm Prepares for Its Own Listing," Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2009,
p. C3.
7 C. Thomas Keegel, International Sec'y-Treas., Int'l. Bro. Teamsters, Letter to
Duncan Niederaurer and Richard Ketchum, June 16, 2010.
S Ibid.
9 Peter Lattman, "KKR To Stage IPO of Dollar General," Wall Street Journal, August
21, 2009, p. B4.
10
Kelly, "Paulson'S Capital."
II
Julie Creswell, "On Wall Street, So Much Cash, So Little Time," The New York Times,
June 24, 2010, p. 5
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Kuan,12 the hidden infrastructure established by investment banks on
the regulated stock exchanges was a critical backstop to policing the
problems caused by the separation of ownership and control. With that
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corporate governance and finance on Wall Street and in Washington,

DC. The labor movement is playing a crucial role in these debates
through traditional lobbying but also through its newly established

infrastructure now seriously damaged, the future health of capitalism

shareholder activism programs at the AFL-CIO and the breakaway

ment of the issues that inherently plague financial capital.

AFSCME, the Teamsters and SEIU. These and other critics of corpor

nor to bury him. This chapter is an attempt to assess this critical insti

lies behind the distorted behavior of corporations. But this is a mis

be better understood. As a critical supporter of corporate social respon

ment of PE funds. For the new corporate responsibility movement to

will depend on the emergence of new forms of oversight and manage
A cautionary note is in order: I come forward neither to praise Caesar

tutional player so that the current playing field of global capitalism can

group "Change to Win" and at several major union affiliates such as

ate behavior argue that the "jinanciaZization" of the modern economy

guided view of modern capitalism and largely irrelevant to an assess

sibility efforts such as those proposed by the international labor move

reach its full potential, a new approach is required.

a clear understanding of the nature of the institutions that dominate

traded stock of a target firm and, arguably, because of their complete

ment" and European social democratic parties, it is important to have
our economy and that I believe will be, in some form, a key part of the

response to the current crisis.

The chapter will proceed in five parts. First, I will attempt to describe

the world as managers of private equity funds as well as some of their
critics see it. Second, I will summarize the structure and mechanics of

PE funds, including the importance of leverage to their success. Third,
I will discuss what I have referred to here as the separation of ownership

Typically, PE funds take companies private by buying up the publicly

control of the company, they can then more effectively deploy firm assets

to productive and profitable uses.l4 After an LBO, the senior inside

managers have one boss - the PE fund - to whom they must respond
rather than thousands of dispersed public shareholders. This appears

to allow firms to act more decisively. For example, Robert Nardelli, the
controversial new CEO of the auto giant Chrysler, which was taken

over by Cerberus Capital, told the New York Times that the company

and control problem, including its modern formulation as an ((agency"

has "become more nimble" and that a new slogan at the company is

critically assess the "counter-attack" on PE funds from labor and the

slow maybe." Thus, a recent decision on cutting production was made

problem, firSt clearly formulated by Berle and Means. Fourth, I will
left, which I believe is wrongly rooted in the concept of "financializa
tion." I will conclude with an attempt to summarize what I consider to
be the "real" nature of private equity.

II

PE's worldview

PE fund managers argue that they offer a potential solution to what

being used to describe decision-making: "Either a yes or a no but not a
in "several minutes/' he said, while it would have taken months at a
publicly traded firm.15

Once a firm's managers have generated the benefits from this new

decisiveness and flexibility, the PE fund will eventually re-sell the tar

get firm to another private owner or back to the public in an initial

public offering (or "IPO") of their common stock. These re-sales can

generate huge profits for the PE funds' professional staff, outside inves

many have long argued is the core problem of the modern corpor

tors and the managerial teams put in place at the target firm. Jay Ritter

outside shareholders. This tension between corporate managers and

annual revenues at or above $50 million generated three-year buy and

ation: the ability of insiders of public companies to take advantage of
public investors has become a key factor in post-Enron debates about

lZ

13

calculates that over a twenty-year period some 666 companies with

hold returns of more than 45 percent for buyout fund backed IPOS.16
14

Stephen Diamond and Jennifer Kuan, "Ringing the Bell on the NYSE: Might a
Nonprofit Stock Exchange Have Been Efficient?" (2007) 9 Duquesne Business Law
Journal!.
The leading advocate for reform of the private equity sector in the international labor
movement has been the International Union of Foodworkers, a global labor umbrella
group based in Geneva. See www.iuf.orglbuyoutwatch (last accessed February 22,
2011). The substance of my critique of the limitations of the labor attack on PE will
become clear in the chapte�.

15

16

The large buyout funds such as Blackstone and KKR are now diversified alternative
asset managers engaged in a range of businesses in addition to the traditional corporate
buyout market. A discussion of this diversification is outside the scope of this chapter.
Associated Press, "Chrysler CEO Pleased With Labor Contract," in The New York
Times, October 30,2007. Of course, the Chrysler buyout hit huge headwinds with the
recession that followed the credit collapse.
Jay Ritter, "Some Factoids About the 2007 IPO Market - Long-run Returns,"
available at: http://bear.cba.ufl..edulritter (last accessed February 22, 2011). Market
adjusted and style adjusted returns are lower.
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PE funds also find ways to generate returns when the IPO window is
closed. In a recent, albeit extreme, example, the $4.3 billion buyout of
British company Travelport, owner of the online travel website Orbitz,
.
returned 100 percent of the $1 billion in equity invested in the company
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for the poor performance of Debenhams after its re-listing. At Chrysler
PE decisiveness was used to pressure the United Auto Workers union
into unprecedented concessions that led to a dramatic downsizing of
the workforce as well as huge wage cuts. The ratification vote of a new

by its new PE owners, Blackstone and Technology Crossover Ventures,

collective bargaining agreement by union members was very close, with

in less than a year. The firm used a new technique called a "dividend

opposition led by one of the UAW's own lead negotiators, Bill Parker,
head of a large Chrysler union 10cal.l9 CEO Nardelli, however, called

recapitalization" - it borrowed more money once taken over and issued
that borrowed money as a dividend to the PE funds. Of course, that
rewards the PE fund and its limited partners by increasing the debt
burden weighing on the target company.
At the large UK clothing retailer Debenhams, some £2 billion (1.4

the agreement "revolutionary" claiming it is "a major step forward" to
restoring the company's competitiveness.2o
What is not at issue, however, is that PE funds mark a potentially dra
matic change in the ownership structure of US businesses with import

billion in debt and 600 million in equity) was used by a consortium of

ant implications for labor and society as a whole. Yet the reaction to this

private equity firms including CVC, TPG and Merrill Lynch Private

development varies widely across the left and the trade union move

Equity to take over the company. A dividend recapitalization yielded £1. 2
billion to the three firms, a 200 percent return on their original equity,

ment. Some view the emergence of PE funds as a source of new prof
itability for labor managed pension funds, while others argue that the

and that waS followed by a profitable IPO. According to the Financial

funds represent another step in the emerging dominance of "financial"

Times: "Merrill - along with the other buy-out firms - has made a hand

capital that undermines job security and union power.

some return on the investment regardless of the share price performance
following the float. The three private equity firms made more than three
times their collective initial £600m equity investment in less than three
years."17 In a discussion over whether the Debenhams deal was a "flip"
or "flop" the Financial Times explained their profit calculations:
While the exact profits from the deal have never been disclosed, the FT has
calculated that TPG invested about [250m and made an estimated return of
£675m, excluding the 14 per cent stake it kept after the flotation. eve put in
about £215m and made close to £580m with a 9.7 per cent stake, while Merrill
Lynch Private Equity invested £135m to earn about £365m and an 8.5 per

The arrival of a potentially new stage in the history of capitalism is,
without doubt, an unusual and perhaps perplexing event. The last such
moment was marked seventy-five years ago by the publication of The
Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932 by legal scholar Adolf
Berle and economist Gardiner Means.21 Their book is now recognized
as a critical, if flawed,22 study of the publicly traded corporation, which
was then still a relatively new and little understood institution. Their
analysis of the potential tension between inside managers and outside
investors remains relevant to the dysfunction that, to this day, often
can plague the public corporation. Berle and Means argued that when

cent stake. Staff are thought to have made close to £50m from their 4 per cent

corporations sell shares to the wider public it enables the firm's inside

stake. John Lovering, Rob Templeman and Chris Woodhouse, Debenhams' top

managers to control the day-to-day operations of the business, often

executive team, made estimated profits of £21m, £41m and £41m respectively
and retained combined stakes worth about £60m at the time of the float.18

Whether the restructuring put in place at such companies is rational

taking advantage of that privileged position to enrich themselves at the
expense of outside investors. Now, seventy-five years later, it appears
that PE funds offer a different approach to managing businesses, def

or destructive is a hotly debated issue. Travelport laid off hundreds

initely still capitalist but distinct from the Berle-Means paradigm

of workers in its first year under new private ownership but contends

firm with its separation between ownership and control. Because PE

it has both hired hundreds of new workers (no doubt at much lower

funds close the gap between ownership and control they presumably

wages), and invested heavily in new technology. Although cash flow
improved, cost-cutting and real estate sell-offs were blamed, in part,

17
18

"Debenham's Shares Tumble over Merrill's Departure from Buy-out?" Financial
Times, March 27, 2008.
"Debenham's Flip or Flop?" Financial Times AlphaviUe Blog, August 6, 2007, on file
with the author.
_

19 Tiffany Ten Eyck and Chris Kutalik, "Oppositio.n Swells Against Concessionary
Auto Contracts," LaborNotes, December 14, 2007.
20
Associated Press, "Chrysler CEO Pleased."
21
Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(New York: Commerce Clearing House, 1932; 1991).
22
Clifford Holderness, "The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States" (2009)
22 Review of Financial Studies 1377.
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eliminate the damage that gap can generate. Thus, PE funds mobilize

plans have invested more than $50 billion in private equity alone in the

hundreds of billions of dollars in the capital markets with the purpose,

last decade.24

it is argued, of resolving the failings of public corporations that EerIe
and Means first identified

The subset of private equity itself consists of several different types of

funds including buyout funds (the class that includes KKR, Blackstone,

Carlyle and others), venture capital funds, mezzanine funds and dis
III

How do private equity funds work?

tressed securities. Each has a different investment strategy but they
share certain basic characteristics. They are aU typicaUy structured

Ey what alchemy of financial engineering or corporate restructuring do

as ((limited partnerships," where a general partner raises money from

PE funds carty out their magic? Private equity is a subset of a larger div

investors who wiU be limited partners, or "LPs," of the fund. The gen

ision within the financial world called "alternative assets." Alternative

eral partner, or "GP," then manages the money raised, usually through

assets typically are defined to include private equity funds, hedge funds

a separate management company, choosing where to invest and how to

and real estate funds. Over the last twenty years large institutional

best monitor those investments. The LPs have only a "limited" role in

investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, foundations

the day-to-day life of the fund, waiting, instead, patiently for an eventual

and university endowments have turned to this asset class as a means

return of their investment, hopefully with a significant profit. In return

to diversify away from the lower average returns found in traditional

for the sacrifice of active oversight, the LPs gain limited liability pro

stocks and bonds. Until the late 1970s the fiduciary standards applied

tection - liable only for losses up to the value of their investment in the

to pension funds and other large institutional pools of capital required

fund. By definition LPs must be large institutional players or wealthy

them to stick largely to what were then considered secure investments

individuals because the GP will raise the money for the fund through

such as bonds. However, financial theorists began to argue that diver

a "private" placement where the LP interests being sold will not be

sification across a wider range of assets could allow investors to secure

accompanied by the disclosure of information that public corporations

greater returns without necessarily taking on too much risk. Soon, trus

provide their shareholders. The LPs are thought to be capable, in the

tees of pension funds were allowed to move out of bonds, first into the

words of the US Supreme Court, of "fending for themselves" without

larger equity markets and then into newly emerging "alternative asset"

the disclosure requirements applied by the Securities and Exchange

classes like PE funds. In fact, to fail to make such investments was soon

Commission to public companies.25

viewed as, potentially, a violation of a trustee's fiduciary duty to maxi
mize a fund's returns.

The magic of leverage

Some large institutions now allocate as much as 20 or 30 percent
of their assets to alternative investments. In fact, public sector pen

To better understand the potential returns a private equity fund can gen

sion funds, including those jointly managed with union representatives,

erate, consider a hypothetical example: Private Equity Fund I, or "PEF

are among the largest and most important investors in buyout funds.

I," which proposes to raise a relatively smaU fund, perhaps $100 million,

The Oregon Investment Council, which manages that state's public

to engage in "leveraged buyouts." The general partner of PEF I will pre

employees pension fund, began investing in KKR as early as 1980.

pare an offering memorandum providing basic information to potential

The California Public Employees Retirement System (CaIPERS), the

LPs about the background of the professionals that work for the GP, as

nation's largest institutional investor, has approximately $240 billion

weU as a description of the fund's proposed investment strategy. Assume

under management on behalf of 1.5 million current and future retired

that ten LPs will each invest $10 million in the fund. Unlike a mutual

public employees. Currently, it allocates more than $42 billion of its

fund or a hedge fund, the money that the LPs invest is committed at

assets, or about 24 percent, to alternative investment and real estate

the time the fund is legaUy established, caUed the "close" of the fund,

funds, including buyout funds, venture capital and hedge funds.23

but it will not yet be actuaUy invested. As the GP decide on investment

's

Together, California, Oregon and Washington public sector pension
24
23

Asset Allocation, CalPERS at www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc;::;/investments/assets/
assetallocation.xml (last accessed February 22, 2011).

25

Jason Kelly and Jonathan Keehner, "Pension Plans' Private Equity Cash Depleted as
Profits Sink," Bloomberg News, August 20, 2009.
SECv. Ralston Purina, 346 US 119 (1953).
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targets it will issue a "capital call" to the LPs who then will turn over
the requisite percentage of their prior cash commitment. However, the
G P will need operating capital from the start-up of PEF I so it receives,
typically, a 2 percent management fee annually from the LPs. Thus, for
a relatively small $100 million fund, the G P will receive $2 million per
year to pay the salaries of its professional staff.26 The management fee is
paid even if the fund does not actually make any investments, although
that is relatively rare. Most funds are set up to last for ten years but most
of the $100 million is likely to be "called" and invested within three or
four years of the start of the fund.Z7 Then, the money is put to work and
the LPs wait for an "exit" when the G P decides to liquidate an invest
ment and pay off the LPs.
For a leveraged buyout, or "LBO," fund, the G P typically looks for
"undervalued" publicly traded corporations that can be bought with the
funds invested by the LPs but with the added leverage of debt borrowed
through commercial and investment banks. The meaning of "under
valued" can vary from fund manager to fund manager, but usually it
means that the G P's analysis of the available public information about
the target company indicates that with certain changes in the way the
company is managed its value could be increased significantly. The basis
of that conclusion, of course, is proprietary. The managers of PEF I will
offer the target's current public shareholders a price that is usually at a ·
significant premium to the current market price but not as high as the
G P thinks it is potentially worth. In theory, the current shareholders will
accept because they are unable to earn the same return with the existing
management.
In fact, this financial strategy is of central importance to those sup
porters of "agency theory" who carry on the work begun by Berle and
Means in the 1930s. This kind of takeoveris part of the "market for cor
porate control" that is thought to force managers of companies either to
run them profitably on behalf of shareholders or face a potential take
over by buyout funds like PEF 1. To carry out an acquisition on the
scale of the $26 billion takeover of Hilton Hotels by Blackstone, how
ever, requires far greater resources than even the largest funds, which
26

27

PE league tables indicate that the top fifty funds raised $810 billion between 2003
and 2008, with the lowest amount $5.9 billion and the highest, $32 billion. Private
Equity International, PEl 50 (2008).
The cal1 represents, in theory, a monitoring device for the protection of the LPs. If
an investor is not happy about the fund's performance or management there is an
opportunity for exit. However� tightly negotiated investment agreements as well as
the potential reputation effect limit severely the opportunity for early LP exit. Thus,
ironically� there remains a potential agency problem inside the fund itself even as it
tries to address that problem in its target firms.
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now can run to more than ten billion dollars, can raise directly from
LPs. Hence the concept of leverage: once it has its initial $100 million
committed by the ten LPs, our PEF I will identify buyout targets and
then turn to commercial and investment banks to raise additional funds
to follow through on its acquisition strategy. These funds are usually
raised initially as bridge loans from banks which are in turn sold off to
investors in the wider capital markets. These loans look very much like
the bonds offered by large public companies - they are so-called "fixed
income" instruments with an interest payment due every six months.
Because there is somewhat greater risk associated with many of these
transactions than in the bonds issued by, for example, traditional invest
ment grade companies like G E, that interest rate can be relatively high.
Many of these bonds are so-called "junk" bonds, the very same type
of instrument made famous by Michael Milken in the 1980s, although
they are now called, euphemistically, "high yield debt."
Assuming the availability of $500 billion committed to buyout funds
in the United States currently and a potential 4:1 leverage ratio, the sec
tor can wield $2.5 trillion to search for corporate targets. This capital
base competes for investment opportunities with several other major
players, including the $2 trillion sitting in hedge funds, zs the approxi
mate $4 trillion in sovereign wealth funds of major governmentsZ' and
a relatively small $250 billion in venture capital. 30 One way to consider
the potential socio-economic impact of buyout funds is to compare the
$2.5 trillion figure with the value of the sector's potential targets. The
market capitalization - the total value of outstanding shares at the cur
rent price - of US publicly traded companies on the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ is approximately $15 trillion." Thus, in the
ory, at current levels the buyout sector could take over more than 13
percent of all publicly traded companies. In fact, to make good on the
promises to its LP investors, PE funds must engage in something close to
that volume of takeovers or else it must release its LPs from their capital
commitments - something that LPs are not likely to be pleased about.
While that percentage may seem low, the existence of LBO funds of
this magnitUde affects many more companies than those that become
actual targets. In theory, every public company is a potential target and
thus must take measures to improve share prices to avoid a takeover.
28

29
30
31

Bei Hu, "Hedge Fund Assets to Hit $2 Trillion by Year-End, Survey Says," Bloomberg/
Business Week, April 6, 2010.
IFSL Research, Sovereign Wealth Funds 2010, March 2010.
National Venture Capital Association at www.nvca.org (last visited June 30, 2010).
World Federation of Exchanges, 2009 Market Highlights at www.world-exchanges.
org/statistics (last accessed February 22, 2011).
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Thus, all public companies are under pressure to engage in the kinds of
aggressive restructurings that an LBO fund would carry out.
L everage, of course, also helps magnify the returns to the fund
because the interest on the debt raised through the banks is fixed.
Therefore, as long as the rate of return on the capital used to buy out
target companies is higher than that interest rate the fund is earning
free cash flow. If our hypothetical PEF I can leverage itself 4:1 and raise
another $400 million through its banks, then it will be in a position to
command $500 million. Then the GP can begin its search for appropri
ate targets, buying them up usually through "friendly" deals negotiated
with the current management team, although so-called "hostile" tender
offers made directly to the shareholders of targets are possible as well."
After restructuring the company in a manner that the GP believes will
increase its profitability, the GP will look for an "exit" opportunity.
This usually means returning to the public capital markets and selling
shares in the company back to the public, at a price far higher than was
paid to take the company private. Alternatively, and today often a more
common tactic, is a so-called «trade" sale where the company is sold to
another corporation for either cash or shares in the new company.
For a buyout fund the 2 percent annual management fee is attract
ive and can be quite important in lean times but it is nOt "real money."
The real money for the GP is in the "carried interest," or "carry."
Buyout funds typically receive 20 percent of the returns to the fund
above the initial investment by the LPs. So, let's say PEF I uses its
$500 million war chest to buy a small auto parts company in Ohio. If
the market had valued the company at $400 million, then PEF I will
have bought out the existing shareholders at a 25 percent premium.
Now the GP ofPEF I must find a way to increase the value of the com
pany. They might do it by "slashing and burning" - laying off workers,
moving plants to Mexico or China; or they might do it by renegoti
ating labor contracts with the company's unions that in turn allows
,2
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Many deals in the first wave of LBOs in the late 1980s were done as "hostiles." A
"hostile" refers to a takeover where the acquir�! meets resistance from the target
company management and thus makes a tender offer directly to shareholders to buy
their shares, typically at a premium to the then current market price. A "friendly"
takeover occurs when the proposed acquisition is met with favor by existing manage
ment who often intend to stay with the company after the transaction is completed,
often in return for a significant equity stake in the business. Lobbying by labor and
incumbent managers helped usher in the end of the «hostile" era with the passage of
state level anti-takeover legislation in the late 1980s and 1990s. Takeovers continued
nonetheless as buyers simply allocated larger percentages of the takeover consider
ation to target management to motivate them to back the offers as "friendly." The
current wave ofPE buyouts can be seen as an evolutionary response to the resistance
to hostile transactions.
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management to deploy new labor-saving technologies to lower costs;
or, more likely, a combination of both. As a result of these changes,
if all goes as planned, perhaps four years later the company might be
valued at $750 million. PEF 1's GP may then decide to return to the
stock market for an IPO. Ignoring for simplicity fees and interest pay
ments, PEF I will have made a profit of $250 million after paying off
the $400 million in debt it incurred as well as the original $100 million
investment by the ten LPs.
This will make the GPs very happy: the "carry" is commonly 20
percent of the return to the fund so the GPs will walk away with $50
million on top of their $4 million in management fees collected during
the two-year period. Buyout funds run lean organizations so this $54
million payday will be distributed among a handful of professionals.
KKR, for example, has only 139 investment professionals who man
age the investment of more than $50 billion in assets. The remaining
80 percent of the return from the sale, or $200 million, is returned to
the ten LPs who are presumably happy, too, assuming they don't look
too closely at the social cost of the layoffs or plant closures imposed
on that small town in southern Ohio in order to "turn the company
around." The pension funds have earned a 50 percent annual return
on their original investment, far above the expectations for their main
stream investments in, for example, the stock of Microsoft or GE. Of
course, that is a relatively high return exaggerated to illustrate the
operations of buyout funds. But such returns are not unheard of or
impossible for a single investment. Funds formed by GPs like KKR
and Blackstone have regularly returned 20-30 percent per annum or
more to their LPs while typical returns in the stock market are in the
single digits."
While PE funds may respond to a genuine and deep problem inher
ent in the nature of the public corporation, they bring with them, how
ever, their own peculiar set of problems, some of which may be more
destabilizing and socially destructive than any wrought by Enron and
its progeny. And while many on the left and in the labor mOVement may
appear to comprehend the nature of these new funds, their perspective
is limited by the intellectual impact today of the framework put in place
by Berle and Means in the 1930s. Does the story that PE funds tell
about insider mismanagement make sense? Should we welcome the PE
buyout strategy as a necessary pill to swallow? An effective response to
the new capitalism requires a reconsideration of the dominant Berle
Means paradigm.
��

Ritter, "Factoids."
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IV

The problem with the public corporation

It is not well known today, although more recently a handful of legal
scholars have begun to remind US,34 that Berle and Means had two aims
with their 1932 study: to explore what they felt was the central govern
ance problem of the public corporation as described here but also to
situate a solution to that problem within their social democratic vision
of governance. The former has lived on, even in the mainstream law
and economics scholarship that dominates· much of the academic and
policy debate about corporate behavior. But the latter has gone down
the memory hole.
Berle and Means argued that while the public corporation solved
one problem for capitalism it created yet another for society at large.
The demands of the rapid industrial growth of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries required massive amounts of capital that indi
vidual businessmen, even if they were as wealthy as J.P. Morgan or
Andrew Carnegie, could not provide. Sometimes this was a "push"
process: family controlled firms began to sell off ever-larger portions of
their firms to outside investors. Sometimes it was a "pull" process: Wall
Street firms engineered the roll up of small family owned entities into
larger, more efficient and, thus, profitable entities, earning sizeable fees
in the process. The food retail giant known today as Safeway began its
life this way when Charles Merrill (the founder of banking giant Merrill
L ynch) engineered the merger of thousands of smaller local stores into
a new entity that he then "took public" in 1928 through the issuance of
shares that were soon listed on the New York Stock Exchange. For the
first time in US history, the business of the United States was genuinely
a public endeavor. While 4.4 million Americans owned shares in 1900
by 1928 the number had risen to 18 million."
The growing weight of publicly traded companies raised an alarm
for Berle and Means. They argued that the modern corporation "has
brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal
terms with the modern state."" The potential social damage that could
be done by the new institution was sharply highlighted by the collapse
$4

See William W. Bratton, "BerleandMeans Reconsidered at the Century's Tum" (2001)
26Journal ojCorporarion Law 737; William Bratton and Michael Wachter, "Shareholder
Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation" (2008) 34
Journal Corporation Law 99; Dalia Tsuk, "From Pluralism to Individualism: EerIe and
Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought" (2005) 30 Law and Social Inquiry
179; Cynthia Williams, "The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency" (1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 1197.
35 EerIe and Means, Corporation and Private Property, p. 56.
% Ibid., p. 313.
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of the capital markets in 1929. For these New Deal intellectuals this
triggered the need for a "constitutional" approach to the governance
of the corporation that would re-generate legitimacy to the decision
making processes of what was to them as much a socio-political institu
tion as an economic one.
Driving this political approach was their insight into the inherent
problem of the corporation: that it was plagued, as suggested here, by
a fundamental separation of ownership and control. Smith and Marx,
among others, had mentioned this issue in passing but in eras when the
"joint stock" company, as it was largely known in the nineteenth cen
tury, had nowhere near the importance it took on by the early twentieth.
Since Berle and Means viewed that separation as a permanent and ser
ious disability, it required a new doctrinal approach to corporate law. In
fact, their argument presented a deep challenge to then-dominant free
market liberalism: if the corporate form contained within it two com
peting interest groups, managers and investors, then this tore asunder
the notion of a civil society of competing individual businesspersons
with clear and unambiguous property rights to their business assets
generating efficient, and socio-politically legitimate, outcomes through
arm's-length trading in the marketplace. The emergence of the modern
publicly traded corporation, then, arguably triggered a larger crisis in
political theory.
As they wrote in 1932:
The separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the inter
ests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge and where
many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear
... New responsibilities towards the owners, the workers, the consumers and
the State thus rest upon the shoulders of those in control. In creating these new
relationships, the quasi-public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolu
tion. It has destroyed the unity that we commonly call property - has divided
ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it. Thereby
the corporation has changed the nature of profit-seeking enterpriseY

To help solve this problem - and to do so within the boundaries of
some form of "capitalism" the authors looked to the already estab
lished law of trusts to argue that corporate managers, those who "con
trolled" the corporation, had to behave with as much rectitude on
behalf of outside shareholders, the "owners" of the corporation, as the
trustees of a trust fund did for the beneficiaries of the trust. As then
Judge, and later Justice, Benjamin Cardozo wrote in a widely cited 1928
opinion issued just as Berle and Means were conducting their initial
37

Ibid., p. 7.
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research: "A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
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Together, these agency costs add to the cost of capital and thus to

marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most

the cost of "doing business." But, agency theorists argue, if laws and

for most New Deal era politicians who backed away from the most radi

ill fact, the resulting predictability can make investing in such an envir

ities laws put in place then, including the Investment Company Act,

between national financial markets such as London and New York,

sensitive is the standard of behavior."" This approach proved too much
cal proposals coming out of FOR's brain trust, but the federal secur

which regulates private equity funds, did create new forms of oversight
of corporations and financial institutions that remain in place today, if
in muted form..
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Meinhardv. Salmon, 164 N.B. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, Ch. J.).

and Wi1li�m Mecklin��
39 On agency costS, see the classic statement by Michael Jensen
Ip Structure
"Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownersh
(1976) 3 Journal ofFinancial Economics 305-360.
Posner, EconomicAnalysis of the Law (New
40 A good summary can be found in Richard
York: Aspen, 1977).

�ontracts

are efficiently designed, these costs can be minimized, and,

onment more attractive. Thus, in today's debate about competition

some argue that the higher cost of regulation in the US markets is,

ultimately, worth paying; while others argue that the mix of legal inter

vention and private ordering through contractual arrangements has
gone awry with post-Enron reforms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

raising the costs of managing a public corporation in the United States
to an intolerable level.

But what if you could design a corporate or financial structure that

would eliminate so-called "agency costs"? The result would be truly

revolutionary: potentially, at least, it could mean the elimination, or at
least dramatic minimization, of costly contractual negotiations over the

complex relationships that exist today among senior corporate manage

ment, boards of directors, Wall Street financial analysts, individual and
institutional investors and government regulators. Enron, WorldCom,

Tyco - all are considered examples of the problems that arise when
agency problems are not adequately resolved.

This is, in part, the justification used to form private equity funds -

they hold out the promise of eliminating the modern corporation's

agency problems by concentrating ownership and control in a single
institution. Voila! A problem that has plagued Anglo-American cap
italism for more than a century might just disappear. Interestingly,

continental European and Asian capital has largely avoided this issue
by continuing to rely on state, family or closely networked ownership

forms. However, they have also, it can be argued, lost the opportun
ity to take the kinds of risks that the use of "other people's money"

allows one to take with the public corporate form. Nonetheless, pri
vate equity is aggressively entering those markets as well with an

agenda that is similar to that found in the United States and the
United Kingdom.

V

The labor-left counter-attack

Trade unions have an ambivalent attitude toward the rise of private
equity. On the one hand, many US labor unions have representatives
on the boards of the same pension funds that are largely responsible

for the steady flow of capital into PE funds and, of course, that means
some union members have benefited handsomely from the funds' above
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average returns.4! On the other hand, over the last decade organized

labor has developed a relatively sophisticated program of investor activ
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Fund has its own PE arm and engineered a bid to buy out Bell Canada
in 2007, only to find the deal first delayed and then fall apart altogether

ism through the Office of Investment at the AFL-CIO, the Capital

in the face of the credit crisis.

affiliates. This effort relies on labor's pension fund investments in pub

hotel, restaurant and clothing industry workers, was effusive in its praise

Strategies Group of Change to Win and similar groups at key union
lic companies to raise concerns about corporate social responsibility,
excessive CEO pay, workers' rights and internal corporate governance.

But labor does not seem to have made up its mind whether Or not PE

funds raise or lower corporate standards of behavior. When it was clear

in spring of 2007 that German auto giant Daimler was looking to sell
off its troubled Chrysler division, United Auto Workers union presi
dent Ron Gettelfinger said he would oppose a PE bid for the company
because such an investor would "strip and flip" the company.42 A few

weeks later, after a meeting with Cerberus Capital, which had by then

announced a deal with Daimler, Gettelfinger sang a completely new

rune. Without any internal discussion, debate or vote by the UAW mem

The leadership of Unite Here!, an amalgam of unions representing

for the multi-billion dollar biCl by Blackstone for Hilton Hotels, stating
in a press release issued as soon as the deal was announced that it "wel
comed" the transaction contending "Blackstone has demonstrated its

commitment to fair treatment for thousands of hotel workers."'17 But when
Blackstone announced its intention to sell shares to public investors in an

IPO, the AFL-CIO and SEW, though nOt working together, each criti

cized the transaction. The AFL-CIO wrote to the SEC in a call for the

enforcement of the governance requirements of the Investment Company

Act against Blackstone. Both labor groups began campaigning to raise tax
rates on PE partners' income from the carried interest in their funds.48

Unlike North American unions, European labor has been largely

bership at Chrysler, he announced that the takeover bid by Cerberus

united in a campaign against private equity. In a 2007 report entitled

ship, the Chrysler Group and Daimler."" Reacting to Gettelfinger's

of the UK's GMB, the century old general workers union with more

Capital for the car company ''was in the best interest of our member
endorsement of the deal, Canadian Auto Workers union leader Buzz
Hargrove initially told the New York Times "the history of private equity

has been to buy, then slash and burn a lot of jobs, and then get out
with a lot money for a handful of people."44 But in very short order,

after a meeting with Cerberus Capital's CEO, Hargrove too reversed
course, telling reporters, according to Edwards Auto Observer, "he was

convinced Cerberus was 'not about slice and dice ... they're in it for the
long term."'" The New York Times reported that Chrysler rank and file

workers expressed surprise and confusion at the change in tune from

union leaders}' Some Canadian labor groups have gone even further

than verbal endorsements of PE deals. The Ontario Teachers Pension

"Private Equity'S Broken Promises," the Central Executive Committee

than 600,000 members, blasted PE funds}' The report lists dozens of
examples of British companies taken over by PE funds using debt to
replace equity followed by layoffs and then exit transactions that led to
huge paydays for the partners and investors in the funds. In 2004 the
"AA," the British automobile insurance .and roadside protection asso

ciation, was bought from its corporate parent by buyout funds CVC

Capital and Permira. The GMB had voted AA Employer of the Year in

2003, but under PE ownership one-third of its workforce was laid off
with disabled workers apparently a particular target, wages were cut,

the workday at call centers was increased from 8 to 11.75 hours, and the
GMB was forced out and replaced by a company union. Meanwhile,
the company took on close to 2 billion dollars of new debt and paid

Permira and CVC a special dividend of nearly a billion dollars.
Michael J. de la Merced and Peter Edmonston, "Cerberus Goes Where No Firm
Has Gone Before," The New York Times, May 15, 2007 ("Big pension funds of public
employees like Calpers are among the biggest institutional investors in private equity
firms, and public pension money accounted for about a quarter of all new money
raised by private equity last year").
Daimler to Cal1 Off Chrysler
42 Kevin Krolicki and Poornima Gupta, "UAW Presses
Sale," Reuters, April 18, 2007.
Unions," Edmunds Auto Observer.com,
43 Michelle Krebs, "Cerberus Charms Chrysler's
May 16, 2007.
Union Backs Sale," The New Yorl�
44 Nick Bunkley, "Chrysler Workers Surprised After
Times, May 15, 2007.
45 Krebs, "Cerebus Charms."
46 Bunkley, "Chrysler Workers Surprised."
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A second report issued by the Geneva based IUF, the international

trade union body that represents 12 million workers in 336 unions in the

47
48

49

"Hotel Workers Union Applauds Blackstone-Hilton Combination," Unite Here!
Press Release, PR News, July 3, 2007.
AFL-CIO, Statement for the Record, United States Senate Committee on Finance
Hearing on Carried Interest Part III: Pension Issues, September 6, 2007 ("the AFL�
CIO sees no valid justificati0r: for the individuals who manage private equity, real
estate, and hedge funds to receIVe tax subsidies that leave the burden of paying ordin
ary tax rates to working people").
GMB, "Private Equity's Broken Pension Promises" (2007).
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food, farm and hotel sectors around the world, highlighted the impact
of debt financing by PE groups.50 The report noted that while public
companies may have a debt to equity ratio of 1:10, once bought out by
a PE fund that ratio is often reversed. Frequently, PE funds then cause
the companies they take over to take on additional debt in order to
pay out a dividend to their investors because an exit opportunity seems
too far away. In a presentation to British Labour Party MPs the IUF's
Director of Communications, Peter Rossman, noted that KKR and
Carlyle shared in a $250 million dividend only a month after closing on
the $4 billion debt financed buyout of satellite operator PanAmSat.51
The Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC ) to the OECD joined
in the European campaign, noting in a report last spring that "the high
rates of return required to finance private equity debt-driven buy-outs
can jeopardize target companies' long-term interests and provision of
decent employment conditions and security for employees." The TUAC
called for regulatory reform of tax rates, corporate governance, trans
parency, risk management and workers' rights. 52

"Financialization�' or pluralism redux?
The focus by unions on the role of debt in PE-led deals is critical but
the impact of debt on the governance of a firm is not well understood.
For several years, labor and left-wing critics of globalization have pro
moted the concept of "financialization" as a leading symptom of the
post-Cold War capitalist economy. The late Marxist economist Paul
Sweezy argued in Monthly Review that by the end of the 1980s the
world economy "had given way to a new structure in which a greatly
expanded financial sector had achieved a high degree of independence
and sat on top of the underlying production system."" Robin Blackburn, a
socialist, took a similar approach recently in the New Left Review where
he wrote: "It is not household names like Nike or Coca-Cola that are
the capstones of contemporary capitalism, but finance houses, hedge
so

51
52

53

International Union of Food, Agricultural" Hotel, Restaurant, Caterin& Tobacco
and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF), A Workers' Guide to Private Equity Buyouts
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f unds and private equity concerns, many of which are unknow
n to the
general public. In the end even the largest and most famous
of corpora
tions have only a precarious and provisional autonomy within the
new
world of business - ultimately they are playthings ofthe capital markets.""
The IUF's Rossman calls "financialized . capital" "extreme
ly impa
tient," "volatile, highly mobile, and linked to a variety of new
financial
instruments based on debt." In an article for the ILO's journal

Labour
Education Rossman and his IUF colleague Gerard Greenfield defined
"financialization" as "both the enhanced importance of financial
ver
sus real capital in determining the rhythm and returns expected
from

investments, and the increased subordination of that investme
nt to the
demands of global financial markets.""
As should be clear, each of these analysts, although they come
from
different political traditions, defines the current capitalist period
as one
in which finance dominates the so-called "real economy." This would
appear to be a relatively simple reprise of the longstanding populist view
that what all too often plagues what would be an otherwise healthy
cap
italism is a tension between, on the one hand, the interests of
({real,"
('productive" capitalists who roll up their sleeves and build compani
es
and, on the other, those who merely "speculate" using financial
assets
like so many chips in a casino. As such, this view is, in fact, a restate
ment of the original Berle-Means paradigm of the separatio
n of owner
ship and control, only in reverse.
Berle and Means were working in a period when it was widely believed
that corporate managers had triumphed over the financial markets.
Keynes famously spoke favorably in his General Theory published
in

1936 of the potential for the "euthanasia of the rentier, of the function
less investor."56 In Stalin's Russia, that policy was in fact carried out
with
unparalleled brutality. Berle and Means' book was followed in 1941
by
James Burnham's hugely popular The Managerial Revolution that caught
the mood of the day when it argued that the United States,
Germany
and Russia were all suffering from the imminent global triumph
of a
new bureaucratic post-capitalist class. 57 In this intellectual and political

milieu it was nOt a surprise that Berle and Means compared the
new

(2007).

Peter Rossman, Presentation to Trade Union Sponsored Labour MPs on Private
Equity and Leveraged Buyouts, February 27, 2007.
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and Development, "Growth With Equity," Trade Union Statement to the OECD
Ministerial Council Meeting, May 15-16, 2007, at p. 9.
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Robin Blackburn, "Finance and the Fourth Dimension" (May-June 2006) 39 New
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Peter Rossman and Gerard Greenfield, "Financialization: New Routes to Profit, New
Challenges for Trade Unions" Qanuary 2006) 142 Labour Education 55.
5 6 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New
. York: Harcourt Brace, 1936).
57 James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (orig. 1941) (Westport: Greenwood
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boards of directors of public corporations to "a communist committee

were formed, financed by Wall Street and prospered; other older com

of commissars" and cast the corporate director as someone who ((more

panies faltered, lost support in the financial markets and went out of

nearly resembles the communist in mode of thought than he does the

business. Workers fought for and organized unions, engaged in col

protagonist of private property."" Nor was it shocking for Gardiner

lective actions and pushed for higher wages, sometimes successfully, in

Means to write of a new "collective" capitalism emerging in the United

other cases unsuccessfully.

States. 59 Berle and Means' work was critical because it described a

atus oflawyers, bankers and brokers, leaving the corporate entity in the
hands of technocrats.
As it turned out, of course, Berle and Means were wrong, as were
Burnham and Keynes. Capitalism was not morphing somehow into a
Stalinist post-capitalist nightmare. It was true that the capital markets
took many years to recover from the trauma of 1929 and to learn how to
function within the new regulatory framework that New Deal legisla
tion imposed on the economy. But the capital markets never disappeared
and neither did competition within the modern capitalist economy. As
recent research by Barry Holderness concludes, Berle and Means, in
fact, radically overstated the number of companies with powerless dis
persed shareholders.60 Many publicly held US businesses retain sizeable
shareholders with "control blocks" that enable them to influence man
agerial decision-making.6l Thus, most takeovers of public companies
are friendly transactions, with existing management induced in various
ways to agree to the acquisition. Indeed, to day's PE funds often are able
to engage in soft landing takeovers with handsome premiums paid to
shareholders as well, who are then free to redeploy their capital in other
parts of the economy.
In other words, it may have looked as if outside investors had no
weight inside the corporate boardroom, but to have written offthat pos
sibility altogether would have meant to argue that competition itselfwas
no longer operating inside the US economy. No matter how much influ
ence government regolation or spending may have had at the height of
the Cold War, US corporations continued to compete with each other,

y Berle and Means had failed, on

But if in their assessment of realit

method by which these managers appeared to have triumphed from
within capitalism itself aided by a newly expanded Wall Street appar
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the ideological front they succeeded in helping to redraw the frame
work within which US capitalism was understood. An emerging real
world battleground in the 1930s where, on the one hand, managerial

and financial capitalists together were pitted against, on the other hand,
a militant new labor movement with ideas about radical reorganiza
tion of economic activity, was recast as a need to (socially) democratize
the principles that governed the behavior of the new managerial class.
This technocratic analysis became the basis of the dominant postwar
ideology of industrial pluralism, with interest groups competing in the
"space" left open between giant business and labor organizations.62 It is
a similar Cold War pluralist ideology that is used by SOme in US labor
and business groups today to promote "constructive engagement" with
an authoritarian regime like that of China, arguing that a new "space"
is being opened up by the regime's market reforms. In fact, there is even
less space there for a genuine labor movement than there was, or is, in
a United States dominated by the ever-evolving alliance of managerial
and financial capitalists.
Thus, the left - from socialist to social democratic - was completely
unprepared intellectually for the restructuring of US capitalism under
way over the last twenty years. Its thinkers remained, and largely remain,
compelled by the apparent progressive promise of the liberal pluralist
ideology that took hold as earlier labor militancy was beaten back by
war, repression and new legal structures such as the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947. The reCent capitalist restructuring has included downsizing,
outsourcing and dramatic technological change alongside growth in
the financial markets. The attempt to cast these recent developments
as just the "financialization" of capitalism is a non sequitur. This view

often bitterly, in capital, labor and product markets. New companies

ignores what capitalists actually do. Instead, whether or not consciously,

58

shifts within the economy - and, of course, a focus on "power" is part

59
60

61

it gives credence to a populist argument that focuses on apparent power
Berle and Means, Corporation and Private Property, p. 245.
Gardiner Means, The Corporate Revolution in America: Economic Reality 'Os Economic
Theory (New York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1962).
Holderness, "Myth of Diffuse Ownership," p. 1377 ("Although BerIe and Means
offer considerable empirical evidence, upon close examination their evidence is not as
supportive of diffuse ownership as is often believed"). I am grateful to Henry Manne
for bringing the work of Holderness to my attention.
Ibid. ("The ownership of U.S. :firms is similar to and by some measures more concen
trated than the ownership of firms in other countries.")

62

Among those legal scholars with a revived interest in Berle and Means, Tsuk focuses
most closely on the pluralist dimension of their work but without discussing the wider
context of class conflict and only a limited concern with the influence of Stalinist and
fascist elements in the New Deal itself. Normatively, Tsuk laments the defeat of the
"lasting meaning" of Berle and Means' concern with corporate power by the law and
economics school, which may explain her focus. See Tsuk, "Pluralism."
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and parcel of a pluralist worldview. We are not in a corporatist world
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relationships with senior managerial talent in a range of industries. The

of interest groups competing for power, but in a world where owners of

partners of PE funds also tend to have backgrounds in the financial

capital employ highly specialized managers, who also have an oppor

markets and are very sensitive to the concerns of the professionals who

tunity to become owners of capital, to generate and appropriate value

invest on behalf of large institutions such as pension funds. In turn

_

in production.63 W here workers organize, economically and politically,

and this is crucial - today's buyouts, as I suggested, are largely friendly

they must do so in opposition to the organizational intent of both those

transactions where the buyout fund plans to work closely with exist

managers and financiers, who share a mutual interest in the continu

ing management because the PE fund parmers know these executives

ing dynamic of restructuring.64 This is the very heart of the capitalist

have crucial inside knowledge about the target firm. A clear example

process - in China as well as in the United States, as true in 2010 as in
1932.

VI

of this is the Cerberus buyout of Chrysler: the new owners announced
their intention to keep Thomas LaSorda on board as president because
he was thought to have a good relationship with the leadership of the

Conclusion: the real nature ofprivate equity

UAW.65 Because significant concessions from the UAW were and will
continue to be a major goal of the buyout that relationship would be

It is particularly inapt to cast private equity funds as a form of "finan

highly valued both by Cerberus and by the investors in the billions

cialization" of capitalism. Private equity actually concentrates in a new

in debt needed to carry out the transaction. In addition, the buyouts

institutional form the resources and abilities of investors together with
the on-the-ground knowledge of managers. While it is true that PE
funds rely heavily on debt and other financial instruments to engage in

are friendly with respect to the major shareholders who dominate US
corporations. Rather than riding to the rescue of helpless dispersed
shareholders, then, PE funds must engage skillfully the complex alli

ever larger deals and magnify their returns, their success in this effort

ance between managerial and operational employees, on the one hand,

depends on very careful attention to the details of how to operate the

and the large institutional investors like pension funds and hedge funds

targeted businesses so that the financial instruments used to take over

that together own today's public corporations.

control are appropriate to the task.
Thus, some may properly criticize the new CEO of Chrysler, Robert

We are not witnessing in the early twenty-first century some kind of

coup d'etat by "finance" against the "real" economy, any more than the

Nardelli, for his outsized pay packages while overseeing a decline in

agency problems of the publicly traded corporation meant that a new

profitability at his previous company, Home Depot. But to ignore his

class of managers took power in the mid-twentieth century. The rise of

deep understanding of the production process would be foolish - prior

some widely traded public corporations in the era of Berle and Means

to joining Home Depot, where, of course, he picked up a first class

should, instead, have been seen as a successful effort to marry finan

education in the consumer goods segment of the economy, he ran the

cial resources with managerial talent in a new capitalist form. But even

highly respected locomotive production operations of GE. And the

then many large companies retained concentrated ownership among a

debt instruments used in PE-led deals actually embody in a detailed set
of heavily negotiated contracts the terms of a complex new social rela

few large shareholders. Today, we might be wimessing what Harvard
Business School's Michael Jensen predicted in 1989 would be the

tionship between investors, PE fund managers, investment bankers and

"eclipse of the public corporation."" But perhaps that should read the

managers of the target companies.

"eclipse of those still remaining widely traded public corporations."

Thus, the PE fund must have within it a concentration of very spe

Private equity led buyouts represent an evolution in the effort by a

cialized talent to coordinate the takeover process and access to and

significant fraction of sophisticated players in the economy to forge
new methods of managing and controlling the process of creating and

6:> See Dan Krier, Speculative Management: Srock Market Power and Corporate Change
(Albany: State University of New York, 2005).
64 The ever-present problem at the heart of capitalism is the tension between increases
in productivity on a social scale and the heteronomic ownership structure of individ
ual business units. Thus, managers (financial and production based) must constantly
face the readjustment of their cost and profit estimates as new technology undermines
yesterday's assumptions.

65 Micheline Maynard, "Latest Chrysler Twist Adds Mystery to LaSorda's Fate," New
York Times, September 6, 2007 ("Mr. LaSorda is overseeing Chrysler's negotiations
with the United Automobile Workers union, familiar territory for him, since his father
and grandfather were officials of the Canadian Auto Workers").
66 Michael C. Jensen, "The Eclipse of the Public Corporation" (September-October
1989) 67 Harvard Business Review (revised 1997).
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Pension funds as owners and as
financial intermediaries: a review of
recent Canadian experience
Simon Archer

I

Acting like Qwners?

In the spring Qf 2007, a venerable Canadian cQrpQratiQn, Bell Canada
Enterprises (BCE), became an acquisitiQn target, and an acquisitiQn
agreement was subsequently signed. Until the deal was unwQund Qn a
technical valuatiQn clause, it was the biggest prQPQsed leveraged bUYQut
in Canadian histQry: it was big news. SQme Qf the features Qf this tranS
actiQn were the size and nature Qf the target (fQrmerly a regulated mQn
QPQly) and the identity Qf the primary purchaser, Ontario. Teachers'
PensiQn Plan (OTPP, an QccupatiQnal pensiQn plan fQr elementary and
secQndary schQQl teachers). It might nQt have attracted much mQre
attentiQn - pensiQn funds had been purchasing and cQntrQlling CQm
panies in Canada fQr a decade Qr mQre - but then in August 2007,
abQut two. mQnths after the deal was made, the Canadian and then glQ
bal credit markets seized up, and the General Financial Crisis (GFC),
as it has CQme to. be knQwn, ensued. AbQut a year later, the deal was
unwQund, but Qnly after the bQndhQlders Qf BCE visited the Supreme
CQurt Qf Canada cQmplaining Qf their treatment thrQugh the whQle
process.1
FQrgQtten nQW are SQme Qf the mQre curiQus lQcal aspects Qf this
deal: OTPP (Qr any Qther pensiQn fund) was prQhibited frQm Qwning
BCE - at least Qn paper - by Ontario. pensiQn legislatiQn. The CEO Qf
OTPP, a public sectQr uniQn pensiQn plan, publicly mused that it may
restructure BCE, which implied tackling the uniQnized BCE emplQyees.
Indeed, it was said anecdQtally that OTPP had a PQlicy Qf nQt invest
ing in businesses that sPQnsQred defined benefit pensiQn schemes - Qf
which OTPP was Qne Qf the biggest in Canada. CQntrary to. past prac
tice, in this deal, a major Canadian pension fund sought to own a local

1

BeE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders [2008] 3 SCR 560. The bondholders lost and so the
transaction could have gone forward but the deal collapsed when a valuation term
could not be met in the midst of the GFC.
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